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Abstract  
Since the abolition of the official peg and the introduction of a managed float in April 
2012, the Central Bank of Myanmar has operated the daily two–way auctions of 
foreign exchange aimed at smoothing exchange rate fluctuations. Despite the reforms 
to the foreign exchange regime, however, informal trading of foreign exchange 
remains pervasive. Using the daily informal exchange rate and Central Bank auction 
data, this study examines the impacts of auctions on the informal market rate. First, a 
VAR analysis indicates that the official rate did not Granger cause the informal rate. 
Second, GARCH models indicate that the auctions did not reduce the conditional 
variance of the informal rate returns. Overall, the auctions have only a quite modest 
impact on the informal exchange rate. 
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Impacts of foreign exchange auctions on the informal market rate in Myanmar 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The effectiveness of official intervention in foreign exchange markets is a crucial 
policy issue for authorities in developing countries. As argued by Canales–Kriljenko 
(2003), official intervention in foreign exchange markets could be more effective in 
developing countries than in industrialized countries for several reasons. However, 
empirical studies on foreign exchange interventions in developing countries are rather 
scant due to the unavailability of high–frequency data on official interventions 
(Menkhoff 2013). We contribute to this growing body of literature on official foreign 
exchange intervention in developing countries with a case study on Myanmar. 
In April 2012, Myanmar abolished its official peg, which had grossly overvalued the 
Myanmar kyat for over two decades, and introduced a managed float. In the new regime, 
the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) introduced daily foreign exchange auctions, 
which now determine the official exchange rate. 
Despite such a stark reform, the informal foreign exchange market that developed 
during the previous exchange rate regime remains pervasive. Prior to the reforms, 
private exporters and importers traded foreign exchange at mutually negotiated prices 
irrespective of the official exchange rate. This informal foreign exchange market 
continues largely as before the reform. 
The post–reform foreign exchange auctions are expected to serve as an intervention 
instrument enabling the CBM to smooth fluctuations in the informal market rate (IMF 
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2013). However, foreign exchange sales through the auctions conflict with another 
intermediate target of the CBM, namely to strengthen its international reserves. 
Considering conflicts in policy targets, it is crucial to ascertain the auctions’ 
effectiveness in smoothing informal exchange rate fluctuations. 
Drawing on the literature of official intervention in foreign exchange market, we 
evaluate the impacts of these auctions on the informal market rate in Myanmar. We 
measure the volatility of the informal exchange rate returns using generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models and evaluate the impact 
of auctions on the conditional variance of informal exchange rate returns. We use data 
on the daily auctions and informal market exchange rates for this analysis. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on foreign exchange auctions and official intervention in foreign exchange market. 
Section 3 outlines the foreign exchange market in Myanmar, which comprises both 
official and informal markets. Sections 4 and 5 present empirical analyses by time series 
econometrics to evaluate the impacts of the auctions on the informal market. In Section 
4, we use Granger causality tests in a bi–variate vector autoregression (VAR) model of 
the informal and official rates to examine whether the official rate impacted the informal 
rate. In Section 5, we employ GARCH models to evaluate the impacts of auctions on 
the volatility of informal rate returns. In Section 6, we summarize the analysis and 
conclude the study. 
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2. Foreign exchange intervention in developing countries 
 
2.1 Foreign exchange auctions 
According to the survey of foreign exchange market organization in developing and 
transition economies undertaken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2001, 
foreign exchange auctions are relatively common in these countries (Canales–Kriljenko 
2004). A full 34 percent of the 91 surveyed countries held foreign exchange auctions. 
These countries usually held their auctions complementarily with the interbank dealer 
market of foreign exchange; pure auction market structures whereby the central bank 
periodically auctions surrendered foreign exchange are no longer as common as they 
were in the 1980s when they were documented by Quirk et al. (1987).  
Auctions are conducted in various ways. In one case, the central bank purchases 
foreign exchange from commercial banks to strengthen its foreign reserves. In another 
case, the central bank supplies the foreign exchange, which comes from the foreign 
exchange receipts of the government. 
In some cases, foreign exchange auctions serve as an intervention instrument for the 
central bank to smooth exchange rate fluctuations. For instance, in Turkey, the central 
bank conducted two–way auctions whereby it called for both bids and offers of foreign 
exchange (Tuna 2011). 
 
2.2 Official intervention  
In terms of the channels through which official interventions in foreign exchange 
markets might work, the literature indicates the portfolio balance effect and the 
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signaling effect.1 In the portfolio balance effect, intervention changes the balance 
between domestic– and foreign–currency–denominated assets in the markets, which 
induces the investors to adjust their portfolio, changing the exchange rate. In the 
signaling effect, in contrast, the information contained in interventions modifies investor 
expectations regarding the future spot exchange rate, leading to an immediate 
adjustment to the current exchange rate. 
In the literature that empirically examines the effectiveness of official intervention, 
one common approach is the GARCH model. In this approach, volatility of exchange 
rate returns is measured as the conditional variance of the GARCH model, and the 
impacts, if any, of interventions on conditional variance of exchange rate returns are 
evaluated econometrically.  
The empirical literature concentrates on industrialized countries such as Australia, 
Germany, and Japan. This is mainly due to the availability of high–frequency data on 
interventions from these countries. Existing studies on the effectiveness of interventions 
in industrialized countries have produced mixed results. On the one hand, some studies 
have found intervention to be effective, including Kim et al. (2000) on Australia and 
Hoshikawa (2008) on Japan. In contrast, Baillie and Osterberg (1997) and Dominguez 
(1998), who both examined interventions in Germany and Japan, and Edison et al. 
(2006) who studied Australia, all found that interventions were associated with higher 
volatility of exchange rate returns. 
There is a growing body of literature on foreign exchange interventions in developing 
countries. Canales–Kriljenko (2003) lists three structural factors that potentially 
                                                   
1See Sarno and Taylor (2001) for a survey of the literature. They point out international coordination as 
another channel. 
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differentiate the effectiveness of official foreign exchange intervention in developing 
countries from those in industrialized countries. First, official interventions are not 
always fully sterilized in developing countries, unlike in industrialized countries. 
Changes in money supply stemming from non––sterilized interventions would reinforce 
the effect of interventions. Second, given the existence of shallow foreign exchange 
markets in developing countries, the relative size of interventions is larger in developing 
countries than in industrialized countries. Considering these two factors, the portfolio 
balance effect could be more pronounced in developing countries. Third, some central 
banks in developing countries might be able to use reporting requirements to gain an 
information advantage in the foreign exchange market over other market participants, a 
situation less likely to exist in industrialized countries. Overall, foreign exchange 
interventions in developing countries might be more effective than those in 
industrialized countries. 
Empirical studies on foreign exchange interventions in developing countries are still 
in a nascent stage. According to the survey by Menkhoff (2013), empirical studies on 
official interventions in developing countries tend to focus on four Latin American 
countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru), the Czech Republic, Croatia, and 
Turkey.2 Empirical results on the effectiveness of interventions are mixed. Broto (2013) 
and Menkhoff (2013) argue that the diverse institutional circumstances and policies in 
developing countries might account for the differences in effectiveness of official 
interventions. 
We contribute to this growing body of literature that empirically analyzes foreign 
                                                   
2Empirical studies on developing countries not covered in Menkhoff (2013) include Shah et al. (2009) on 
Pakistan and Simwaka and Mkandawire (2012) on Malawi. 
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exchange interventions in developing countries by testing the effectiveness of official 
intervention in Myanmar. Due to the lack of monetary policy instruments, interventions 
are not sterilized in this country.3 On the other hand, Myanmar has a pervasive informal 
foreign exchange market. The case study of Myanmar would therefore be a unique 
addition to this growing field. 
 
 
3. Structure of Myanmar’s foreign exchange market 
 
3.1. Formal market 
Since the abolition of the official peg of the Myanmar kyat in April 2012, the CBM 
has operated daily two–way foreign exchange auctions. Participants are 14 local banks 
to whom the CBM granted authorized dealer licenses.4 In its daily auctions, the CBM 
calls for sealed bids and offers of US dollars from the banks. The banks then submit 
their price and quantity bids (offers) to the CBM. The bids and offers must be fully 
covered by a bank’s current account deposits held at the CBM. The CBM sets the cut–
off price of US dollars in terms of the Myanmar kyat and accepts the bids (offers) above 
(below) the cut–off rate. In auction terminology, it is a discriminatory auction where 
bidders (offerors) are awarded at their bid (offer) prices.5 
There are two notable points in Myanmar’s foreign exchange auctions in comparison 
                                                   
3The sole monetary policy instrument at present is deposit auctions, which have been held only twice per 
month, whereas foreign exchange auctions are daily. 
4Eleven banks received these licenses in November 2011. In August 2012, three more banks obtained 
authorized dealer licenses. 
5For an explanation of auction terminology, see Feldman and Mehra (1993). 
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with those held in other developing countries. First, the daily auctions are two–way: the 
CBM accepts both bids and offers from participating banks. Second, no systematic 
arrangement exists to transfer the government’s foreign exchange receipts, such as 
export revenues from state enterprises, to the CBM due to the state sector’s obsolete 
foreign exchange administration. Thus, the CBM’s supply of foreign exchange is rather 
limited at present.6 
The introduction of the auctions was a consequence of the country’s shallow and 
underdeveloped official market for foreign exchange. Until October 2011, banks had not 
been permitted to engage in foreign exchange trading. Although state banks had been 
offering international banking services such as current international payments and 
transfers, they did not sell or buy foreign exchange with customers; buyers and sellers 
of foreign exchange had to find counterparties outside the banking system (explained in 
more detail in the following subsection). During the reform process, the private banks 
who had been newly granted foreign exchange dealer licenses moved ahead of the state 
banks with respect to money–changing services in October 2011 and customer dealing 
of foreign exchange in August 2012. Later, in August 2013, the CBM instituted an 
interbank market for foreign exchange. This series of reforms are still paving the way 
for the establishment of a two–tier official foreign exchange market: (1) the wholesale 
segment including the official auctions and the interbank market, and (2) the retail 
segment including banks’ customer dealings and transactions at authorized money 
changers.7 
                                                   
6The transfer of the government’s foreign exchange receipts to the CBM is one of the reform agendas in 
the country (IMF 2013). 
7The CBM has also issued money changer licenses to non-bank firms since December 2012, but these 
money changers are not permitted to participate in the auctions. 
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In the face of the underdeveloped interbank foreign exchange market, the auctions 
enable the CBM to obtain a market–based official exchange rate. The CBM publicly 
announces the daily auction’s cut–off rate as the “official reference rate” and uses it to 
regulate exchange rates in official wholesale and retail markets. The buying and selling 
rates at authorized dealer banks and money changers are restricted to within a range of ± 0.8 percent of the “official reference rate,” which the CBM updates each working 
day. The reference rate itself is discretely determined in the auctions, and there is no 
band on it. 
Furthermore, the auctions equip the CBM with an intervention instrument in the 
foreign exchange market. The IMF (2013: 7) concludes that the CBM has sought to 
smooth exchange rate fluctuations without targeting a specific level or range. Figure 1 
summarizes the auction’s daily records for the period April 2012–September 2013, 
along with the trends in the “official reference rate” and prevalent informal rate. As 
shown in this figure, when the informal rate appreciated (depreciated) sharply, the CBM 
purchased (sold) dollars with a more depreciated (appreciated) exchange rate, implying 
attempts by the CBM to adjust the informal market rate. 
 
Figure 1 
 
However, one of the auction’s important negative impacts is the resulting foreign 
reserve outflows. As the foreign exchange auctions are two–way, they can lead to either 
accumulation or dissipation of foreign reserves. For example, in March 2013, the 
monthly sales and purchases of foreign exchange were USD 145.3 million and USD 5.5 
million, respectively. This net outflow of USD 139.8 million amounted to 4.7 percent of 
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the foreign reserves.8 Thus, official interventions to defend the Myanmar kyat against 
depreciation conflicted with the accumulation of foreign reserves. 
 
3.2. Informal market 
Despite Myanmar’s foreign exchange policy reforms, the informal market remains 
pervasive, a legacy of the country’s previous peculiar exchange rate regime. Prior to the 
April 2012 introduction of a managed float, the Myanmar kyat had been officially 
pegged to the special drawing right (SDR) of the IMF at 8.50847 kyat per SDR; the 
official rate had not been adjusted for over three decades. However, this official rate had 
been applied only to transactions in the public sector for fiscal accounting. For the 
private sector, there had been, in principle, no allocation of foreign exchange or 
surrender requirement on foreign exchange earners (IMF 2012). 
Under the previous fixed exchange rate regime, private exporters and importers were 
relegated to the informal market where they traded foreign exchange competitively. As 
for the proceeds from formal exports, foreign exchange regulations restricted private 
exporters to only being able to deposit them in the state banks in foreign currency 
deposit (FCD) accounts. However, this was different from a surrender requirement. By 
regulation, the banks could not accept conversion of FCD into the Myanmar kyat or 
withdrawal in foreign currencies, whereas they tolerated domestic account transfers of 
FCD. Domestic account transfers of FCD thus fostered private exporters’ ability to sell 
FCD to importers by transferring FCD to importers’ accounts in exchange for side 
payments in Myanmar kyat. In this way, buyers and sellers traded FCD at bilaterally 
                                                   
8According to IMF (2014: 22), the Central Bank’s foreign reserves as of the end of March 2013 were 
USD 3,062 million. 
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negotiated prices. Sometimes brokers acted as middlemen and their quoted prices of 
FCD (i.e., informal exchange rates) were widely circulated in the private sector.9 
It is worthwhile mentioning that informally traded FCD could be used for imports in 
the formal channel. In addition to FCD, informally held foreign exchange such as 
proceeds from smuggling exports were traded in the informal market. The regulations 
differentiated informally held foreign exchange from the FCD, and did not approve the 
former’s use for formal imports. 
The practice of informal foreign exchange trading in the private sector remains 
largely the same even after the ongoing reforms were first enacted. We can infer the 
informal market’s turnover in relation to the formal market’s turnover. Since August 
2012, private exporters have had two choices for disposal of export revenues: banks (the 
official market) and the informal market. When banks deal with customers, banks buy 
foreign exchange from exporters and sell it to importers. Thus, if the customer dealing 
of the banks were substantially small compared with exports, it would signal the 
informal market transactions between the private exporters and importers.10 
Table 1 compares turnover of the official foreign exchange market with private 
exports. We use private sector exports as a yardstick since the state sector does not sell 
foreign exchange to banks or in the informal market under the state budget system’s 
administrative controls.11 The turnover of the banks’ customer dealing includes both 
                                                   
9Major brokers disseminated their quotes via the short message service (SMS) of mobile phones. 
10Some exporters import as well, and they use export revenues for their own imports. A part of the 
disparity between the exports and customer dealing of the banks is attributable to such export–import 
firms. 
11Kubo (2013) offers an account of the controls on foreign exchange in the state sector. In principle, 
export revenues of the state sector are maintained as the FCD of the state and they are disbursed only to 
the state sector. 
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sales and purchases of foreign exchange by the banks. If all private exporters had sold 
their export revenues to the banks, who in turn had sold the entire sum received to 
private importers, the ratio of the banks’ customer dealing to private exports would be 
2 : 1.12 The actual ratio is as low as 0.27 : 1. On the assumption that the banks have 
accurately reported their customer dealings, this low ratio implies a considerable scale 
of informal foreign exchange trading occurring between private exporters and 
importers. 
 
Table 1 
 
 
4. Relationship between official and informal exchange rates 
 
We examine the relationship between the Central Bank rate (official reference rate) 
and the prevalent informal market rate since the introduction of a managed float in April 
2012. If the auctions exert an influence on the informal market, a rise in the official 
reference rate would be accompanied by a rise in the informal market rate. We examine 
the relationship of the two rates by the Granger causality test. 
The data used in this study are as follows. For the informal rate, we use the broker 
buying price of US dollars in the informal market at the closing of the market in the 
afternoon, disseminated by a private market information service company.13 The official 
rate is the daily auction cut–off rate, which is publicly announced at around 10:00AM 
                                                   
12Similarly, the turnover of the central bank auctions includes both sales and purchases of foreign 
exchange by the CBM. 
13e-Trade Myanmar Co. Ltd. (http://etrademyanmar.net/newetm/home) 
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the same day as the auction. The official rate is posted on the CBM’s website.14 The 
sample period spans from April 2, 2012, to September 30, 2013. The total number of 
observations is 360. We use variables in logarithms and denote the informal market rate 
and official reference rate as ln (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡) and ln (𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑡), respectively. 
Initially, we examine the data’s time series properties. First, we check the stationarity 
of the two time series using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller test. The test statistics 
indicate that both  ln (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡)  and ln (𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑡)  are non–stationary in their level but 
stationary in their first difference at the 1 percent significance level. Thus, we judge 
they are I(1) variables. Second, we test if two variables are co–integrated in their level. 
The Maximum Eigenvalue test indicates that the null hypothesis of no co–integration 
cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level.15 
Accordingly, we estimate a bi–variate vector autoregression (VAR) model in their 
first difference as follows: 
 
∆ln (𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑡) = 𝛼1 + 𝐴11(𝐵)∆ln (𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑡−1) + 𝐴12(𝐵)∆ln (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡−1) + 𝜀1𝑡, (1) 
∆ln (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡) = 𝛼2 + 𝐴21(𝐵)∆ln (𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑡−1) + 𝐴22(𝐵)∆ln (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡−1) + 𝜀2𝑡, (2) 
where 𝐴𝑖𝑖 are the polynomials in the lag operator L; 𝜀1𝑡 and 𝜀2𝑡 are independently 
distributed disturbance terms. We test the null hypothesis that 𝐴21(𝐵) = 0. Rejecting 
the null hypothesis implies that the CBM could exert an influence on the informal 
market rate.  
As to the empirical model, the lag length is pared to 3 from 20 by both the Akaike 
Information Criterion and Schwarz Information Criterion. As to the model diagnostics, 
                                                   
14Central Bank of Myanmar (http://www.cbm.gov.mm/) 
15For evaluation of co-integration relationship, we include 20 lags of ∆lnCBM and ∆lnBLK, where ∆ 
refers to the first difference. 
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the Lagrange multiplier test indicates that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of 
residuals for lag order one cannot be rejected at the 10 percent significance level. Thus, 
it is appropriate to proceed to the Granger causality tests with this VAR model. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the Granger causality tests. The null hypothesis 
that ∆ln(CBM) does not Granger cause ∆ln(BLK) cannot be rejected at the 10 percent 
significance level. On the other hand, the null hypothesis that ∆ln(BLK) does not 
Granger cause ∆ln(CBM) can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level.  
 
Table 2 
 
We can interpret these results in two ways. In one interpretation, the CBM can be 
seen as trying to follow the informal exchange rate rather than guiding it. A policy target 
of the CBM has been to dissolve the multiple currency practices (MCP) and align the 
official reference rate with the informal market rate, containing the gap between the 
informal and official exchange rate in the 2 percent range.16 If this is the case, we 
cannot judge precisely the CBM’s ability to influence the informal exchange rate. 
In the other interpretation, the CBM did seek to influence the informal exchange rate 
occasionally, but did not succeed. As shown in Figure 1, the gap between official and 
informal market rates sometimes widened and persisted, implying that the CBM did 
attempt to adjust the informal market rate. If so, the empirical result could be interpreted 
as an indication of the CBM’s limited ability to influence the informal market.  
 
                                                   
16If the auction rate differs from another prevalent market rate by 2 percent, it is regarded as MCP, which 
requires approval from the IMF (Canales–Kriljenko 2004: 18). 
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5. Effect of foreign exchange auctions on the informal rate’s volatility  
 
5.1. Data 
We evaluate the impact of auctions on the volatility as well as the level of the 
informal market rate return. When changes in the informal market rate have a time–
varying conditional variance structure of errors, we can capture it through a GARCH 
model. We then analyze the impacts of auctions on the conditional variance of informal 
rate returns in the GARCH model. 
The variables we utilize in this analysis are the informal market rate and daily foreign 
exchange sales and purchases by the CBM through the auctions. The CBM releases the 
daily auction results to participating banks. The sample period spans from April 2, 2012, 
to September 30, 2013. For the informal market rate, we define the daily return of the 
US dollar against Myanmar kyat as follows: 
 
𝑟𝑡 ≡ 100 × [ln(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡) − ln (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡−1)],   (3) 
which is proximate to the percentage change in the informal market rate. A positive 𝑟𝑡 
value indicates depreciation of the kyat against the US dollar. Figure 2 depicts the daily 
return of the US dollar. As is common for financial variables, volatility clustering is 
observable; large changes of the informal rate were followed by large changes, and 
small changes by small changes. The figure clearly indicates that the daily return of the 
informal market rate has a time–varying conditional variance structure of errors. 
 
Figure 2 
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Table 3 summarizes the variables’ descriptive statistics. In this table, except for the 
exchange rate return (𝑟𝑡), 𝐼𝑡  stands for the CBM’s net foreign exchange sales. A 
negative value for this term indicates the CBM’s purchases of foreign exchange. 
Furthermore, 𝐼𝑡+  and 𝐼𝑡−  refer to disaggregated sales and purchases of foreign 
exchange by the CBM, respectively. As for the exchange rate return, the Ljung–Box Q–
statistics for serial correlation reveal that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of 
the squared standardized residuals up to 20 lags is rejected at the 1 percent significance 
level. This suggests the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity of the exchange rate 
return and the GARCH method’s suitability to model its variance. 
 
Table 3 
 
Turning to the disaggregated data of the CBM’s sales and purchases, out of 360 
working days, the CBM sold foreign exchange on 164 days and purchased on 256 days. 
On several days, the CBM accepted both bids and offers. Foreign exchange purchases 
are more varied in size than foreign exchange sales. 
Two types of banks participate in the auctions.17 The first type is private banks that 
arbitrage between the auctions and the informal market. When the informal market rate 
is higher than the official rate, arbitrager banks buy foreign exchange in the auctions 
and sell it to customers. Similarly, when the informal rate is lower than the official rate, 
they buy foreign exchange from customers and sell it in the auctions. The second type 
of participant is the state banks, who mostly sell foreign exchange in the auctions 
whenever they are in need of local currency liquidity. They may not be connected to the 
                                                   
17Turnell (2014) offers a comprehensive overview of Myanmar’s banking sector. 
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informal market. 
The CBM’s pattern of foreign exchange sales and purchases might reflect the above–
mentioned heterogeneity of banks participating in the auctions. Figure 3 contrasts the 
auction net sales with the gap between informal and official rates. As expected from the 
private banks’ arbitrage, the CBM’s sales (purchases) concentrated on days when the 
official rate was lower (higher) than the informal rate. On the other hand, there were 
some lumpy purchases of foreign exchange by the CBM irrespective of the gap between 
the official and informal rates, which might be associated with foreign exchange sales 
by state banks to the CBM. In the following analysis, we consider the asymmetric 
characteristics of the CBM’s sales and purchases of foreign exchange. 
 
Figure 3 
 
5.2. Empirical model 
Following Baillie and Bollerslev (1989), Dominguez (1998), and Edison et al. (2006) 
among others, we analyze the impacts of the foreign exchange auctions on the informal 
market rate returns using a GARCH model. As the baseline model, we add the CBM’s 
net sales of foreign exchange in the daily auctions in both the conditional mean and 
conditional variance equations. In particular, the specification of the baseline model is 
as follows: 
 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜑2𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,     (4) 
 𝜀𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~t(0, ν,𝜎𝑡2),      (5) 
 𝜎𝑡2 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1|𝐼𝑡| + 𝛼𝜀𝑡−12 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−12 ,    (6) 
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where 𝑟𝑡 is the daily exchange return, 𝐼𝑡 is the CBM’s net sales of foreign exchange, 
and |𝐼𝑡| is its absolute value. Equation (5) shows our assumption that the error terms 
have a conditional variance that has the Student’s t density with mean zero, degree of 
freedom ν, and variance 𝜎𝑡2. In Equation (6), α and β represent the ARCH effect and 
GARCH effect, respectively. To address small number of observations, we estimate the 
integrated GARCH model that presumes a priori that 𝛿0 = 0 and α + β = 1. 
  When incorporating the intervention variables into the conditional mean and variance 
equations, some studies, such as Baillie and Osterberg (1997) and Broto (2013), used 
lagged intervention variables in consideration of simultaneous bias. For the case of the 
foreign exchange auctions in Myanmar, the results of the auctions are announced to the 
market around 10:00AM. Data on the informal market rate are the market’s afternoon 
closing price. Therefore, endogeneity is less of a concern compared with the cases in the 
above–mentioned studies.18 
  The parameters of interest are 𝜑2 , which measures the impact of the foreign 
exchange auction on the level of the informal market rate return, and δ1 , which 
measures the impact on the variance of changes in the informal market rate return. We 
expect 𝜑2 < 0 as CBM’s foreign exchange sales would lead to appreciation of the 
Myanmar kyat vis–à–vis the US dollar. Regarding the informal market rate’s volatility, 
if the auctions as official intervention dampen informal market rate fluctuations, then 
the sign on δ1 would be negative. 
  We also estimate an alternative specification of the baseline model by replacing the 
net sales terms in Equations (4) and (6) with the terms for disaggregated sales and 
                                                   
18We also estimated the GARCH models with lagged intervention variables but they did not yield 
significantly different results from those presented in the main text.  
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purchases of foreign exchange by the CBM as follows: 
 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜑3𝐼𝑡+ + 𝜑4𝐼𝑡− + 𝜀𝑡,    (7) 
 𝜎𝑡2 = 𝛿2𝐼𝑡+ + 𝛿3|𝐼𝑡−| + 𝛼𝜀𝑡−12 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−12 .    (8) 
This specification is based on the hypothesis that CBM purchases of foreign exchange 
include the lumpy purchases from the state banks that are not linked to the informal 
market. With this alternative model, we perform the Wald test for the null hypothesis of 
symmetric effects of CBM sales and purchases in the auctions, where 𝐻0 : 𝜑3 = −𝜑4 
and 𝛿2 = 𝛿3. 
 
5.3. Empirical results 
Table 4 reports the results of estimation. Model (1) is without intervention (auctions) 
variables. Model (2) is the baseline model with the CBM’s net sales of foreign exchange 
included in the conditional mean and conditional variance equations. Model (3) is the 
alternative specification replacing the CBM’s net sales with disaggregated sales and 
purchases. For the diagnostics of standardized residuals, in all three models, the Ljung–
Box Q–statistic tests for high–order serial correlation indicate that the null hypothesis of 
no serial correlation in squared standardized residuals cannot be rejected. These 
diagnostic tests indicate that the GARCH models correct the heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 4 
 
We now examine the impacts of the auctions on the conditional mean and variance of 
exchange rate change in the informal market. For Model (2), the coefficient on the 
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CBM’s net sales in the conditional mean equation is negative but statistically 
insignificant. The coefficient on net sales in the conditional variance equation is positive 
and significant at the 5 percent significance level. This implies that the CBM 
intervention was associated with higher informal rate volatility. 
For Model (3), which differentiates the impacts of CBM foreign exchange sales and 
purchases upon the informal rate, the result does not indicate any effectiveness of such 
interventions. In the conditional mean equation, the coefficient on the CBM sales is 
positive and significant at the 1 percent significance level. This implies that the CBM’s 
sales of foreign exchange via auctions were associated with depreciation of the 
Myanmar kyat against the US dollar, rather than appreciation. The coefficient on the 
CBM’s foreign exchange purchases is insignificant. In the conditional variance equation, 
coefficients on both sales and purchases are positive, whereas only the coefficient on 
sales is significant at the 10 percent significance level. Furthermore, the Wald test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on sales and purchases are symmetric in 
the mean equation at the 10 percent significance level, whereas it cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients on 𝐼𝑡+ and |𝐼𝑡−| are the same in the variance equation 
at the 10 percent significance level. 
  The overall results should not be interpreted as indicating that the auctions raised the 
volatility of the informal market rate return. To the contrary, causality might run the 
other way such that the CBM has intervened more in the market when the informal 
market rate has showed abrupt changes. In other words, we consider that the CBM’s 
stance has been one of “leaning against the wind”. 
Furthermore, whereas the CBM’s intervention in the foreign exchange market is 
positively associated with higher conditional variance, its impact is quite modest. Using 
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the estimates of the baseline model (2) in Table 4, we can calculate the 
contemporaneous impact of the intervention on the conditional variance, 𝛿1|𝐼𝑡| 𝜎𝑡2⁄ . On 
average, the intervention accounts for 5.88 percent of the conditional variance. Such a 
result is similar to Edison et al. (2006). 
Regardless of the auction’s modest impact on the informal market rate, their cost is 
not necessarily small. First, the CBM’s sales of foreign exchange sometimes led to 
considerable outflows of foreign reserves, as shown in Section 3. Second, the auctions 
provide windfall gains to the banks that arbitrage between the auctions and the informal 
market. As shown in Figure 3 in this section, the CBM’s sales (purchases) of foreign 
exchange were largely concentrated on the days when the official rate was lower 
(higher) than the informal market rate. Therefore, the foreign exchange auctions should 
be regarded as a transitory arrangement and the CBM should be encouraged to put more 
emphasis on accumulation of its foreign reserves. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Since the abolition of the official peg and the introduction of a managed float in April 
2012, the Central Bank of Myanmar has operated daily foreign exchange auctions. 
These auctions have had three functions: (1) providing the CBM with a market–
determined exchange rate apart from the informal rate, (2) supplying or absorbing 
foreign exchange liquidity in the context of an underdeveloped interbank market, and 
(3) serving as a policy instrument to intervene in the foreign exchange market. 
Using daily data on auctions and exchange rates for the period April 2012–September 
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2013, we analyze the auctions’ impacts on the informal market. First, the exchange rates’ 
bi–variate VAR indicates that the official reference rate did not Granger cause the 
informal market rate, whereas the latter did so for the former. Second, the GARCH 
models incorporating the auction variables indicate that the CBM’s net sales of the US 
dollar did not reduce the conditional variance of changes in the informal rate. 
The empirical results imply that the auctions’ ability to function as a means of 
intervention has been rather modest, whereas they have incurred substantial costs for the 
CBM in terms of eroding the official foreign reserves. Thus, foreign exchange auctions 
should be recognized as a transitory arrangement that should operate only until the 
interbank foreign exchange market is developed. 
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Table 1. Formal trading of foreign exchange and private sector international trade, 
January 2014–December 2014 
  
Monthly average Ratio to  
private exports 
  
US dollar, million 
Wholesale 
  
 
Auction turnover 1/ 165.3 0.41 
 
Interbank dealing turnover 17.5 0.04 
Retail 
  
 
Customer dealing turnover 110.2 0.27 
    
 
Private exports 401.5 1.00 
Sources: Central Bank of Myanmar website; Selected Monthly Economic Indicators, Central Statistical 
Organization (CSO), Myanmar. 
Notes:  
1/: Monthly average for January 2013–September 2013.  
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Table 2. Granger causality between the official and informal rates 
Null Hypothesis ∆lnCBM does not 
Granger–causes ∆lnBLK 
∆lnBLK does not 
Granger–causes ∆lnCBM 
Test Statistics (χ2(3)) 5.8951 107.0716 
P–value that null hypothesis holds 0.116 0.000 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
  
𝑟𝑡 
Exchange rate return 
 
𝐼𝑡 
Auction 
CBM net sales 
𝐼𝑡
+ 
Auction 
CBM sales 
|𝐼𝑡−| 
Auction 
CBM purchases 
 Mean 0.0492   -0.2554  5.3754  3.8027 
 Maximum 2.0225   21.5000  21.5000  44.7500  
 Minimum -1.5125   -44.7500  0.0100  0.0100  
 Std. Dev. 0.3905   7.2595  4.6742  6.4527  
Observation 359   360  164  256  
𝑄(20) 23.121         
𝑄2(20) 88.056 ***       
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Notes: 𝑄(20) and 𝑄2(20) denote the Ljung–Box Q–statistic with 20 lags for the standardized residuals 
and squared standardized residuals. *** indicates that the null hypothesis of no serial correlations of the 
standardized residuals (squared standardized residuals) is rejected at the 1 percent significance level. 
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Table 4. Daily exchange rate return GARCH models 
  Model (1) (2) (3) 
Mean Equation             
  Constant 0.0006   -0.0018   -0.0195   
    (0.933)   (0.838)   (0.070)   
  𝑟𝑡−1 -0.0439   -0.0413   -0.0786   
    (0.350)   (0.417)   (0.120)   
  𝐼𝑡     -0.0004       
        (0.840)       
  𝐼𝑡+         0.0098 *** 
            (0.002)   
  𝐼𝑡−         -0.0030   
            (0.159)   
Variance Equation             
  𝜀𝑡−12  0.2280 *** 0.2853 *** 0.2859 *** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
  𝜎𝑡−12  0.7720 *** 0.7147 *** 0.7142 *** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
  |𝐼𝑡|     0.0007 **     
        (0.036)       
  𝐼𝑡+         0.0014 * 
            (0.081)   
  |𝐼𝑡−|         0.0004   
            (0.148)   
Diagnostics for standardized residuals        
  Q(20) 24.250   27.561   22.693   
    (0.232)   (0.120)   (0.304)   
  Q2(20) 13.325   11.054   9.881   
    (0.863)   (0.945)   (0.970)   
  Log likelihood -50.7060   -41.4274   -35.5877   
Observations 358  358  358  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Numbers in brackets are p–values. 𝑄(20) and 𝑄2(20) denote the Ljung–Box Q–statistic with 20 lags 
for the residuals and squared residuals. The p–value for Q–statistic is the probability that the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlations of the residuals (squared residuals) is accepted. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Figure 1. Auction net sales and exchange rate levels,  
April 2012–September 2013 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Myanmar and the informal market survey.  
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Figure 2. Daily return of the US dollar against Myanmar kyat in the informal market, 
April 2012–September 2013 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Myanmar and the informal market survey.  
Notes: The daily return is calculated as 100x[ln (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡) − ln (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡−1)], where ln (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡) is the informal 
rate on date t in logarithm form. 
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Figure 3. Auction net sales and gap between informal and official rates,  
April 2012–September 2013 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Myanmar and the informal market survey. 
Note: The gap between the informal and official rates is calculated as 100 × [𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡 − 𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑡] 𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑡⁄ . 
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